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I 
CHAPTER TEN 
In the thick of culture: systemic 
and psychoanalytic ideas 
Inga-Britt Krause 
I n the introduction to a book about cross-cultural psyChother-apy, I made the comment that any cross-culturally practising psyChotherapist, in some way, must feel compelled to adopt a 
systemiC perspective (Krause, 1998). This was a statement that 
traced and documented my own personal journey from social 
anthropology to family therapy, but I also wanted to call to mind 
the historical connection between the two disciplines via Bateson 
(Krause, 2006), "culture" as a systemic idea (Krause, 2002), and the 
contribution of social constructionism to contemporary systemic 
psyChotherapy. 
In the same book I worked my way through different areas in 
whiCh cultural patterns, symbols, and meanings impinge, 
constrain, and are implicated in the behaviour and experience of 
persons. These included kinship, emotions, ritual, taboos, and 
secrets. My argument was that muCh cultu!al material is outside the 
realm of individual awareness in the form of different types of 
knowledge and structures, some of whiCh seem unquestionable and 
natural to individuals. (I used Bourdieu's terms doxic and habitus to 
. refer to knowledge, whiCh is imprinted on the body and the mind 
as the result of the operation of structures that are unconsciously 
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168 SYSTEMS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
regulated and that incorporate culturally structured patterns, rou-
. tines, improvisations, and meanings. I quoted Bourdieu as saying. 
"It is because subjects do not strictly speaking know what they are 
doing that what they do has more meaning than they know" 
[Bourdieu, 1977, p. 79].) I referred to material that is "implicit", 
U outside awareness", and to those aspects that are not articulated 
verbally, but I did not use the term "unconscious". This was partly 
because of the technical meaning of this term in psychoanalysis, but 
also because I felt a need to be cautious. The· evidence of cultural 
diversity in areas outside consciousness l.5·abundant, but questions 
about how this works, how we may understand it, and what kind 
of model or theory we may choose to use are complex. illtimately, 
we all have to answer the same ethical questions about our own 
relationship to that with which we are engaged and to the models 
for which we make claims. 
The paradox (if I may use such a strong description) of my 1998 
book was that, while setting out to make important claims for 
systemic psychotherapy, I ended up moving into an area of our 
work (that part of life which is outside consciousness), with which 
systemic psychotherapists had engaged hardly at all as far as croSS-
cultural work is concerned. Eventually, by suggesting that self-
reflection and a kind of cultutal and social transference (Krause, 
2002) are necessary tools in cross-cultural work, I had moved from 
advocating systemic ideas to also advocating psychoanalytic ideas 
as a guide for cross-cultural practice. Through this journey, I have 
come to believe that.! from an individual person's point of view)" 
"culture" is in the same'league as "experience" and "re'ality" 
(Britton, 1995; Flaskas, 2002) and therefore requires similar engage-
ment and recognition from psychotherapiSts, whatever their train-
ing and background. . 
Culture in systemic psychotherapy 
Despite the inspirational influence of Bateson's anthropological 
work in the development of family therapy (Bateson, 1958, 1972), 
the phenomenon of Ii culture" did not receive much attention in the 
beginning of the life of the discipline. The Palo Alto Communica-
tions Project was set up to research all aspects of communication, 
but the collaboration between Bateson and his colleague Watzlawick 
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came to an end over a split between them about whether forms of 
communication could be discussed in isolation from cultural 
communication (Harries-Jones, 1995). Bateson thought that they 
could not, but Watzlawick's and Haley's influence signalled a move 
in family therapy towards behavioural interpretations of human 
relationships. 
Bateson had himself struggled with the tension between local 
details and general descriptions in his writing about schismogene-
sis in the Iatrnul naven ritual. We can trace this struggle through the 
book Naven (1958), and in particular in the development between 
the two Epilogues of 1936 (Bateson, 1958) and 1958. In the 1936 
Epilogue, Bateson was preoccupied with whether or not the labels 
he was using to categorize behaviour were his or whether they also 
belonged to the Iatrnul people themselves. In the 19·58 epilogue, 
which Bateson wrote after having discovered the relevance of 
cybernetics and logical typing to his work, he was quite clear that 
the categories he was using, such as Itethosu and LI cultural struc-
ture", were descriptions of processes of knowing adopted by scien-
tists. Although th~re was still an emphasis on ethnographic 
observation, there was also a notion that what is observed is not 
solely a result of what is going on between the partles in front of 
our very eyes. This was conceptualized using ideas such as "meta-
position", and #p~sitive" and Llnegative feedback". 
Between the two epilogues, Bateson had moved from investi-
gating a partlcular ritual, with all its related details of meaning and 
symbolization, to an attempt to find a generic typology of human 
relationships and .to formulate a general theory about human inter-
action and communication. It was this #recursive vision" (the 
phrase used as the title of Harries-Jones seininal book about ·Bare-
son and his work IHarries-J ones, 1995]), with all its different layers, 
from which Bateson thought that Watzlayvick and Haley had 
departed. Accordingly, those .of Bateson's papers that achieved a 
high and even iconic status in family therapy became those papers 
that focused on behaviour (for example, papers on the double bind, 
the cybernetics of self, and a theory of schizophrenia [Bateson, 
1972]), whereas others, which discussed "meaning" or "culture" 
more directly (for example, papers such as "Style, grace and infor-
mation in primitive art", and "Experiments in thinking" [Bateson, 
1972]), have h~dly been referred to. 
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170 SYSTEMS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Since meaning is ubiquitous, family therapists could hardly 
practise without working with meaning. However, the question of 
whose meaning did not seem to arise very much in the early 
decades of the discipline. The effect of this was that meaning could 
ride on the back of behaviour, which could be observed and there-
fore remain relatively unproblematic. So, for example, the early 
Milan team, who had a reputation of working 'With meaning, 
defined ritual primarily in terms of "action accompanied by verbal 
formulations" (Selvini Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchiit, & Prata, 1977, 
p. 452). It was not until a decade later or so when feminist family 
therapists began to question ideology, that the notion of multiple 
meanings-of whose categories? whose labels or whose mean-
ings?-began to emerge explicitly as an issue in clinical practice. 
Since then, it has been extended and developed in many different 
ways: language generated systems (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988), 
narrative approaches (Epston & White, 1992; White & Epston, 
1990), multiple voices (Hoffman, 1993; Papadopoulos & Byng-Hall, 
1997), cultural lenses (Hoffman, 1990), and open dialogues 
(Seikkula, 1993; Seikkula & Olson, 2003). 
However, despite this emphasis on constructionism in the disci-
pline .. or perhaps because of it, it has been difficult to consider 
meaning-making itself as a system. As Flaskas has pointed out in 
relation to the work of Michael White, the privileging of "new" 
narratives has led to a de-emphaSiS on the continuity of experience 
(Flaskas, 2002, p. 64). It also runs the risk of privileging the thera-
pist's own ideas and notions about relationshIps at the expense of 
the views and orientations of clients, which may be more implicit 
and hidden and therefore not accessible through relatively brief 
conversations (Krause, 2002, pp. 13-16). This suggests a confidence 
in the discipline that meaning is not all that difficult to access, that 
meaning emerges from our dialogues with clients as a result of oUr 
skills in using particular techniques, and that we will be able to 
notice, understand, and attune to them when they do. This entails 
respect for the role of persons in the construction and co-construc-
tion of intersubjectivity, relationships, and communication (often 
referred to as agency), but it is at the same time inattentive to the 
limits and constraints against which these processes take place 
(Hacking, 1999; Flaskas, 2002; Krause, 2002; Lannamann, 1998; 
Malik & Krause, 2005). 
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In summary; systemic psychotherapy has a bundle of theories 
and models, whIch have been influenced by the early choice of a 
behavioural direction and are characterized by a theoretical empha-
sis on the general and the abstract (the meta-), rather than on the 
process .of abstraction. They are also characterized by synchrony . 
rather than diachrony, and by a reluc_ce to theorize those aspects 
of life and experience that lie outside awareness or consciousness. 
These models are also rarely explicit about what is assumed to be 
universal. Our modes of practice and our unders_ding of diver-
sity and differences imply that something must be universal, but we 
do not say what that might be. As a result, we cannot be explicit 
about what might be the constraints on social construction. Thus, 
we remain oblivious to what it is that makes possible what we do 
know about ourselves and our clients in the first place (social 
anthropologists and ethnographers often find themselves in the 
same methodological quandary). 
Cu/t,!re in psychoanalysis 
But what if some of what we all share lies beyond our awareness? 
This is highly probable, since each of us sees the world from our 
particular points of view and what we have in common is therefore 
oniy one variation on a theme. This is, of course, also the view put 
forward in psychoanalysis, where what is .of interest in terms of 
explanation happens in the unconscious. (I am much less qualified 
to speak about psychoanalytic than about systemic theory. Here, I 
mainly rely on my own reading of the theories of Klein [1945, 1946], 
Bion [1962], and Britton [1995].) In many ways, a psychoanalytic 
approach is the opposite of a systemic one, with an emphasiS on 
diachrony in the form of child development, on ·unconscious feel-
ings and motivations, and an explicit claim that, this is a universal 
model. In this model, the early eXperiences of the baby and the 
processes through whIch these are addressed become a kind of 
blueprint for mature persons. 
In the world of the newborn infant there are no persons, but 
only powerful sensations, whIch the baby experiences as coming 
from the outside. When the baby is hungry, for example, this is 
experienced by. her as an attack from the outside, as if something 
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172 SYSTEMS AND PSVCHOANAL YSIS 
outside is the bad experience. The baby learns to deal with her anxi-
ety through her carer(s) attending to her, in the course of which the 
baby's projections are given back to her in a modified way. This 
helps the baby "contain", or take back into herself (introject), a 
strong, good, and containing carer / mother. Now the baby is ready 
to accept a world view in which new things can be contemplated 
and tested, which allows frustration to be tolerated and discomfort 
to be recognized, not as an attack, but as the feeling of absence of 
something that the baby might want. . 
For Klein, Bion, and Britton, the baby developing an ability to 
work through to this state (the depressive position) depends on the 
introduction of the third person, or a triangle, in her life. This 
person or these other persons challenge(s) the blissful dyadic sym-
biosis with the primary carer, and this enables the baby to be an 
observer to .other dyadic states (Britton, 1995), to herself (Bion, 
1962), and is also implicated in the development of thought and 
language (Hobson, 2002). If the blissful idealized state of one-ness 
is unmediated, on the other hand, this is conducive to generating 
states of mind in which the baby agaln feels attacked and reacts 
without being able to think and reflect about this (the paranoid-
schizoid position). Because these slittes and functions are the prim-
itive building blocks of persons in relationships with others, they 
are also considered to be states of mind into which mature persons 
may fall agaln and agaln. 
But what of the specific, the particular, the culturally con-
structed, and the local in this theory? The theory attends to the posi-
tion of the infant and the development of fundamental human 
capacities. The functions of the mother or primary carer are high-
lighted in so far as they enhance or hinder the development of these 
capacities. However, in practice these functions are carried out 
within a cultural context of meaning and 'convention, wm'ch 
'provides the rationale for the interaction and communication for 
both baby and carer. What the baby experiences from her carer is 
embedded in cultural conventions and meanings. From this point 
of view, a variety of ways of offering n contairunent" and address-
ing anxiety will be possible in order to reach "normal" develop-
ment and good enough relationships between carers and infants. 
An outline of the most rudimentary caring functions therefore does 
not, by itself, give any clue to how the relationship between cultural 
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variation and universal requirements can be assessed. Instead, it 
runs the risk that cultural variation is overlooked and that norma-
tive expectations are conflated with particular points of view. 
How, then, can cultural variation be addressed from a psycho-
analytic perspective? This is a tricky question. In the famous dis-
cussion about the Oedipus complex between psychoanalysis and 
anthropology; the debate came to a stalemate several times (see 
Cohen,. 2002, and Krause, 1998, for summaries of this debate). 
Anthropologists argued that since familial relationships and 
arrangements do not everywhere adhere to the model of the 
nuclear family found in North European societies, the Oedipus 
complex cannot be said to be universal. This was based on obser-
vations of kinship rules and behaviour, on myths, and on talking to 
local informants. However, the psychoanalytic side argued that 
since some patterns of behaviour and some customs echoed Euro-
pean ones, the meanings that do not fit must be evidence that, far 
from absent, the Oedipus complex was, in fact, particularly strongly 
repressed in the societies in question. While this may be a somewhat 
outmoded view in psychoanalysis today, there remaln questions as 
to how rudimentary ·functions and processes can be accessed 
through levels of language and cultural symbols, and about the 
cultural content of the unconscious. 
Common ground 
In his first ethnography; Bateson approaChed the Iatmul material 
(the Iatmullive in the region of the Sepik river in the eastern part 
of New Guinea) with the idea that the Iatmul ethos in some way 
distilled the logic of a cultural outlook. To examine this, he used the 
naven ritual as a lens through which to examine Iatmul culture, 
much in the way systemic psychotherapists have been taught to 
focus on particular sequences and patterns in therapy sessions and 
relate these to the system"of family relationships. (In the naven 
ritual, a youp.g man who has achieved something that denotes 
adulthood is pursued by his maternal uncle, dressed up as an old 
woman. When the maternal uncle finds his nephew, he rubs his 
buttocks up and down his nephews thigh in a sexualized gesture, 
which causes much hilarity among the onlookers. [Bateson, 1958J.) 
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174 SYSTEMS AND PSYCHOAN~LYSIS 
Bateson had already found a tradition of transvestism in large-scale 
Iatrnul ceremonies" and had noticed how proud women were 'of the 
men's ornaments, which they wore in these ceremonies. However, 
it was not until he himself saw the transvestite uncle dressed up in 
women's rags in the naven ritual., and experienced the emotion of 
this ritual, that he realized that the uncle was a figure of fun, acting 
like a bedraggled buffoon. The contrast between this figure and the 
pride women showed in the male ornaments they were wearing in 
this ritual gave vital clues about the orientation and central themes 
in Iatmul culture. 
This then became the rationale for Batesons subsequent analy-
sis of Itamul culture and his view of the naven ritual as schismoge-
nesis (Bateson, 1958). Later, when Bateson became influenced by 
cybernetics, he did not refer to emotions very much. But in the one 
time when he did, in his argument.with Haley over power (Bateson, 
1978; Dell, 1989), his position that emotions are culturally con-
structed (and that therefore particular emotions carmot be elevated 
to an explanatory principle) was much misunderstood (Krause, 
1993). So, when culture went off the theoretical agenda in early 
family therapy, so did emotions. Since then, this aspect of commu-
nication and interaction has, with some recent exceptions 
(Andersen, 2007; Fredman, 2004; Pocock, 1997), been conspicuous 
by its absence from theoretical debates in the discipline. 
In contrast emotions are at the centre of the theoretical paradigm 
in psychoanalysis. These are rudimentary feelings, motivations, 
and experiences that provide the driving force of the infant's 
emotional and cognitive development. Bion's main concern was 
how thought is applied to emotional experience at a primitive and 
unconscious level, and how this cannot be conceived of in isolation 
from a relationship (Bion, 1962). It is how the carer responds to the 
infant's anxiety which gives rise to the emotional tone of that rela-
tionship. Bion identifies love (L) and hate (H), as well as their nega-
tives, as the rudimentary emotions of the paradigm, and these 
become transformed into elementary and abstract modes of 
thought through the stages of the grid (ibid.). Despite the rudimen-
tary nature of these emotions, it seems that the analyst is able to 
access these in practice in therapeutic sessions, much like a key 
signature in the beginning of a piece of music (Symington & 
Symington, 1996). Bion suggested that the therapist should 
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approach this "without memory and desire", not by inference, but 
through intuition, by becoming one with the intuition resulting 
from the experiencing ~f different emotions (Bion, 1962). Might we 
see this as similar to Bateson's idea that ethos will convey some-
thing of the logic or meaning of a culture or a pattern ofinteraction? 
We could perhaps speculate that this is what happened to Bateson 
when he was confronted with the fun and buffoonery of the mater-
nal uncle in the naven ritual. 
Is this what we, systemic psychotherapists, call "knowing" or 
"not-knowing"? M1,1ch has been made of this dichotomy in our 
discipline (Frosh, 1995; Lamer, 1995, 2000; Pocock, 1997). If we 
approach our clients with a philosophical stance of not-knowing 
(Anderson, 1999), or a stance of uncertainty or doubt (Mason, 1993), 
what does it mean to know or to be certain or to be authoritative? 
Anderson and Goolishian (1988, 1992) did not define this stance 
with reference to emotions or feelings. Their emphaSiS was on how 
the therapist positions herself and how she participates, or not, 
in the creation of new knowledge. "Not-knowing therapists", 
Anderson wrote, "value being public, open and honest about their 
thoughts" (Anderson; 1999, p. 6). But what about their feelings? 
This seems to exclude those aspects and processes that lie outside 
awareness or are unconscious. If Unot-knowing" is a process that in 
some way contributes to the emergence of new meanings, which in 
turn bring other uncertainties, then new meanings must have been 
outside awareness before. 
So how are we to understand the therapist being able to facili-
tate this process? Lamer draws a parallel with the process of 
containment (Lamer, 2000). Very often it is the emotional tone of a 
client's response, or a shift in emotional outlook of a session against 
the background of a regular pattern or a "being with", which gives 
the therapist an indication of whether or not some sort of attune-
ment or engagement has been made. In banishing emotions along 
with culture in favour of an emphaSiS on cognitive processes, texts, 
narratives, and language, we systemic psychotherapists may have 
been a little disingenuous to ourselves. 
Bion's idea of approaching the therapeutic session without 
memory and desire suggests that the therapist can actively develop 
this ability by paying close attention to her own emotional activity 
(Bion, 1962). "Knowing" (K) refers to the analyst's ability of 
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"getting to JillOW something" rather than "having some piece of 
knowledge" (ibid., p. 65), but the analyst must also become so con-
scious of her own emotional experience that she is able to abstract 
"from it a statement that will represent this experience adequately" 
(ibid., p. 50). In this way; knowing implicates thinking, and, for Bion, 
thinking is a way of processing emotional experiences and sensa-
tions. Ability to think, therefore, has a very special place in both our 
emotional life and in child development. For Bion and others (e.g., 
Britton, 1995) early triadic relationships, such ai;, for example, the 
Oedipus triangle, provides the context for this, because in such rela-
tionships the infant or the baby has an opportunity to step out of a 
dyadic relationship and become an observer both to this relation-
ship and to herself. In this model, the analyst's own early experi-
. ences, as well as her current emotional awareness of these and of 
herself, become both a reservoir and a screen for her work with 
patients. 
How can we move from this to some notion of how to access 
meaning in cross-cultural work? By coincidence, Bateson, in a little 
cited publication (Bateson, 1972), and Freud, in a new translation 
(Freud, 2006 [1937], p. 78), both give us an intriguing clue. In his 
essay "Style,.. grace and information in primitive art", Bateson 
defined meaning as a synonym of pattern in such a way that an 
aggregate ' 
can be divided in any way by a "slash mark" such that an observer 
perceiving only what is on one side of the slash mark, can guess, 
with better than random success, what is on the other side of the 
slash mark. [Bateson, 1972, pp. 103-104, original italics] 
And, in a new translation of .uConstructions in .analysis", by 
Bance, where Freud writes about the analyst's constructions of the 
meaning of the patient's talk, the German word erraten, which is 
normally translated as "interpreting", is translated as "guessing" 
(Freud, 2006 [1937], p. 78). Using the word "guess", although per-
haps not very respectable (Wood, 2006, p. 5), highlights not a 
dichotomy, -but some sort of tentative or even vulnerable continuity 
between all human persons and cultures. 
With human beings we are dealing with some sort of patterning. 
It may be difficult to determine the nature of this pattern, but we 
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know that it cannot be a reductionist one" because we know that 
whatever pattern we are talking about in psychological develop-
ment or in social systems, it must leave room for individual varia-
tion which implicates language, history, tradition, and continuity 
without being determined by these. 
Discursive and pre-discursive 
I am not qualified ~o pursue the extensive and complicated debate 
in psychoanalysis 'regarding the content of relationships in pre-
discursive modalities and the constitution of the subject. Instead, 
my assumptions about the subject are as follows: that the attrac-
tions and aversions experienced by human infants towards those 
who care for them and to whom they are attached, as generally 
proposed by psychoanalytic theory, and what we may nowadays 
call a urelational self" as a precondition for social life" as generally 
proposed in systemic psychotherapy, are aspects of a human condi-
tion. Other assumptions pertain to basic physiological and psycho-
logical human need~ and existence such as birth, death, sex and 
reproduction, generations" maturation, the body, suffering, loss, 
hunger, thirst, etc. In this, the subject might be said to be situated 
between what is implicit or unconscious in the context and in rum 
or her, and his or her own agency. 
Beyond this, I assume no specific content of these relationships 
or of the unconscious. How needs are met and functions articulated 
and attended to is a matter of patterns, which are discursively 
constructed over time in specific historical, cultural, and contextual 
localities and not necessarily all within the awareness of individu-
als. It is this we see in the therapy room. We do not see rudimen-
tary functions, nor do we see generic systems or relationships. We 
see persons, who are engaged in social and cultural patterns, 
constructed, developed, contested" and improvised in order to 
address these needs and functions. In terms of practice, I think there 
are two processes. First, a process that requires that we engage with 
what is the' human condition~ not onr asserted by us in our own 
theories or in our own cultural knowledge, but one that can stand 
up to cross-cultural scrutiny. As I have suggested, we already have 
both psychoanalytic and systemic ideas about this, referring to the 
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178 SYSTEMS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
relational nature of the infant's first experiences with her carers and 
the social relationships of these carers, and the significance of this 
for child development and learning. Second, rather than the stances 
of "knowing or/and not-knowing", there are some things we can 
know about ourselves; as for the rest, we are guessing. 
Case material 
In her study of Islam in modem Pakistan, Ewing retells a story 
which she was told by one of her women informants (Ewing, 1997, 
pp. 97-110). This is a story about modernity and traditional beliefs, 
which equally well applies to the workings of different strands of 
ideologies and discourses that exist in any society. 
This story concerns a middle-class, well-off family in which the 
children are college-educated and who consider themselves as 
practitioners of "true" Islam. The story was first told to Ewing by 
the mother in the family. 
A curse (tauna) was performed in the form of a goat's head being 
thrown on to the doorstep. The mother told her son to pick up the 
goat's head and throw it away" but was warned by a friendly neigh-
bour not to let her son touch it becaUse, if he did, this would transfer 
the misfortune and badness from the envious person who had thrown 
the goat's head to him and he would sicken and die. The mother 
obeyed the neighbour, but insisted to Ewing that she did not believe 
this and that she thought it was wrong.' Ewing then heard another 
version of this story from one of the daughters, who t~ld her that her 
brother did take the goat's head and threw it behind the house without 
any untoward consequences. In telling it, she poured scorn on her 
neighbour's ·superstition. To her surprise, Ewing later found this young 
woman preparing for a protective ritual. When ask~d, the young 
woman explained that she had had a bad dream about her father 
coming to harm and that she was performing this ritual in order to 
protect him. 
It thus became clear that these views were specific to context 
and situation. Ewing suggests that the mother's locating herself 
within a different interpretation, and the inconsistency between 
her story and that of her daughter, covered up her reluctance to 
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acknowledge the pain she must have felt that somebody in the 
community had wanted to harm her. In the same way; the younger 
woman's outlook was complex. She wanted to impress her progres-
sive views on the ethnographer, but, when it came to warding off a 
bad dream, there were 'some techniques and activities in everyday 
life which could help her make the world a safer and more familiar 
place (Ewing, 1997, p. 110). The ethnographer is not in a position to 
take up this juxtaposition between what is said and what lies 
behind, but this is the therapist's task, and in this she will surely 
anchor herself in the human desire to ''belong'', lito be with" 
(Molino, 2004) and to ward off suffering and loss, which she recog-
nizes from herself. 
A similar theme of a human predicament emerged in my own 
work with a Pakistani family, 
Rohina, who was tw"enty-three, and the eldest of six siblings, was 
referred with her daughter Aisha when Aisha was six. Robina had 
, obeyed her parents' wish to marry a relative from Pakistan in an 
arranged marriage when she was seventeen. She left school without 
GCSEs, and immediately became pregnant. On finding this out, Robina 
arranged for a termination, but on her way to the clinic, her mother 
persuaded her not~to go through with it. Soon ~fter Aisha's birth, 
Rohina's husband attacked her in a violent outburst and she separated 
from him and moved to live in her own f!.at. Robina's parents were 
disappointed with the separation and the ensuing divorce. Her father 
stopped speaking to her, but her mother continued to help out by 
babysitting Aisha. Robina found it a struggle to attend to Aisha, She 
could not muster any authority except thro~gh hitting and punishing 
Aisha, and when Aisha was two and a half she was placed on the Otild 
Protection Register. 
After some work with social services Rohina managed to stop this- style 
of discipline,. but when she and Aisha were referred to my team, 
Robina was banging her own head against the wall and scratching 
herself as a way of containing Aisha and stopping her from doing 
dangerous things such as running out of the door or turning on the gas 
stove. I was struck by how compliant Robina was. She participated in 
many- parenting classes, took Aisha to all her appointments, tried to 
enforce bedtimes, and provided breakfast. She told me that she wanted 
to show the world that she could be a good mother, but little useful 
knowledge and experience "Was available to her when she found herself 
in an argument with Aisha. It felt to her, I t:hink, that Aisha always got 
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the upper hand and could get the sympathy and support from profes-
sionalsr who would then mistrust and blame Robina in the same way 
as her parents did. I 'was present at many of these arguments .. and 
Robina struck me as being quite desperate and relieved when I inter-
vened. 
I was also struck by the angry vehemence with which Rohina 
denounced arranged marnages and several other traditions that her 
parents and her sisters observed. This mixture of Robina being compli-
.ant and herself" a good girl", of the whole sjstem spiralling out of 
control, and of both mothe;r and daughter needing and being grateful 
for some contairunent, gave :me a feeling of contradiction, stuckness, 
and acting out. I myself felt protective towards both Rohina and Aisha, 
and angry ...nth the social workers. Rohina's attempts to be a good 
daughter and a good mother and a good person seemed always to fail. 
In respecting her parents by having an arranged marriage, an outlook 
highly valued by her parents, Rohina had had the best intentions, but 
she had disappointed and distressed them, as well as herself. Her vehe-
ment opposition to Pakistani values now functioned, I thought, as a 
barrier between herself and the everyday outlooks, desires, and fears 
which characterized her parents and the traditions and everyday prac-
tices with which she herself had grown up. 
With this impression in mind, I asked to meet with Rohina and her 
mother. I thought that we might be able to go back to something which 
could stand for "being with", or "being attached to", something more 
fundamental from which, rather than reducing Robina's experience to 
events in the past, we might be able to open them up for the future. I 
had three sessions with Rohina, Mrs Begum (Robina's mother), and an 
interpreter. We noted that we were four women who were all mothers 
and daughters" and also that the person who had the most children, 
and therefore was perhaps the most experienced, was Robina's mother. 
With this starting point, we were able to talk about how to manage 
when children are naughty and when a mother is not feeling good. We 
were also able to talk about -Rohina being distraught at not being 
welcome in her parents' house, and how this interfered with her feel-
ing that she could be a g90d mother and a good person. After some 
discussion of the pros and cons of marrying a Pakistani man, Mrs 
Begum was able to say that she was sorry for making Rohina marry so 
young and that she accepted that now Rohina would choose her own 
husband if she wanted to marry again. This marked a turning point in 
the therapy and opened up more reflexivity and the prospect of fewer 
splits for Rohina and Aisha. 
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Closing remarks: culture as a process 
I have argued that, paradoxically, perhaps cross-cultural work high-
lights the need for a place for both universality and difference in 
Our therapeutic models and thinking. Psychoanalysis has made 
contributions to the universal domairt, whereas systemic psycho-
therapy theory has been built around the idea of difference. Yet, 
universality and difference as ideas implicate each other. In both 
bodies of knowledge, access to meaning has not only remained the 
central concern, but has also been problematic as far as cross-
cultural work.is concerned. I have argued that the ·therapist may 
combine the two models by clarifying what, on the one hand, might 
be assumed to belong to the pre:.ruscursive and" on the other" how 
the social-cultural context as expressed through disCUl:sive relation-
ships might be accessed. 
One aspect of the pre-discurSive, or what I have called the 
human condition, is the psychoanalytic assumption regarding the 
anxiety of the infant, the adequacy of the carer's response, and the 
re-emergence of primitive states of mind throughout human life. 
This fits qulte well with the social processes, which we know take 
place in the definition of identity and ethnicity (Banks, 1996; Bau-
man, 1999; Jenkins, 1997), with the fundamentalist projections of 
N good" and ''bad'" in the formation and maintenance of rasicm 
(Dalal, 2002; Fanon, 1952; Khanna, 2003), and with theidea that 
culture is prejudicial (Krause, 2002). Cultural conventions and 
meanings enter the infant's experiences from the first interaction 
with carers, providing a process for the negotiation of conflict, anxi-
ety. communication, ang dilemmas. This process might sometimes 
be reflective and sometimes not, but always it is a kind of work that 
weaves between discursive and pre-discursive domains. 
I do not think that we can avoid a double approach. We need to 
recognize emotions as an aspect of the human condition in our 
theoretical model. We cannot banish them, and we also need to 
acknowledge that they are in part culturally constructed. As 
Bateson observed, if we fail to arrive at "a preliminary sketch [of an 
ethos or emotional outlook] our attribution of emotional value to 
behaviour can only be guided by general and probably fallacious 
assumptions about human nature" (Bateson, 1958, p. 268). Cross-
cultural psychotherapy, it seems to me, must continuously move 
between these two levels . 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
What does the other want? 
Stephen Frosh ,~-"' ... 
"0 let them be left" wildness and wet; 
Long live the weeds and the wilderness yet" 
(Gerard Manley Hopkins, 1970, "Inversnaid") 
A fter a rocky start, which resulted in accusations (particu-larly from feminists) of normative politics and blindness to social inequality, systems theory has developed an honour-
aple and now long tradition of engaging with oppression-gender, 
sexual, race, and class-and advocating democratic and emancipa-
tory practices within therapy (e.g., Burck & Daniel, 1995; Mason & 
Sawyerr, 2002; McGoldrick, 1998). The shift from first order to 
second order cybernetics was crucial here, as it forced systemic ther~ 
apists to consider their practices in a reflexive mode, a move that has 
resonance with the "relational" move in psychoanalysis that has 
also struck a chord amongst feminists (Benjamin, 1998). Given the 
very large number of women working psychotherapeutically with 
children and families, it was perhaps predictable as well as neces-
sary that systems therapy would have to deal with feminist 
concerns. Yet, subsequent extensions of the political critique to 
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